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The two most influential traditions of contemporary theorizing about democracy, social 
choice theory and deliberative democracy, are generally thought to be at loggerheads, in that 
the former demonstrates the impossibility, instability or meaninglessness of the rational 
collective outcomes sought by the latter. We argue that the two traditions can be reconciled. 
After expounding the central Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility results, we 
reassess their implications, identifying the conditions under which meaningful democratic 
decision making is possible. We argue that deliberation can promote these conditions, and 
hence that social choice theory suggests not that democratic decision making is impossible, 
but rather that democracy must have a deliberative aspect. 
1. Two Traditions of Democratic Theory  
 
 In the past decade the theory of democracy has been dominated by two very different 
approaches. Within democratic theory as conventionally defined the strongest current is now 
deliberative.1 For deliberative democrats, the essence of democratic legitimacy is the capacity of those 
affected by a collective decision to deliberate in the production of that decision. Deliberation involves 
discussion in which individuals are amenable to scrutinizing and changing their preferences in light of 
persuasion (but not manipulation, deception, or coercion) from other participants. Claims for and 
against courses of action must be justified to others in terms they can accept. Jürgen Habermas and 
John Rawls, respectively the most influential continental and Anglo-American political philosophers 
of the late 20th century, have both identified themselves as deliberative democrats.2 Deliberative 
democrats are uniformly optimistic that deliberation yields rational collective outcomes. 
 The main competing tradition is social choice theory, whose proponents generally deduce far 
less optimistic results. To social choice theorists, the democratic problem involves aggregation of 
views, interests, or preferences across individuals, not deliberation over their content. From the 
seminal work of Kenneth Arrow on, it has been argued that such aggregation is bedeviled by 
impossibility, instability and arbitrariness.3 Arrow proved the non-existence of any aggregation 
mechanism satisfying a set of seemingly innocuous conditions. This critique of democracy was 
radicalized by William Riker, who argued that any notion of a popular will independent of the 
mechanism used to aggregate preferences was untenable.4 Given that there is no good reason to 
choose any particular mechanism over any other, supposedly democratic collective choices are 
arbitrary, and democracy is emptied of meaning.  As Hardin puts it, social choice theory has exposed 
“flaws – grievous foundational flaws – in democratic thought and practice.”5 
 Riker's radicalization of the social-choice-theoretic critique created a chasm between the two 
traditions that might seem impossible to bridge.6 We argue that the two traditions can in fact be 
reconciled. Though social choice practitioners may be unaware of it, some even arguing the opposite, 
we argue that their theory points to the functions deliberation can perform in making collective 
decisions both tractable and meaningful, thus providing a crucial service to deliberative democracy. 
The structure of this paper follows the results of social choice theory, for it is these that both pose the 
challenges to democracy and pinpoint the locations at which deliberative responses must be sought.  
Methodologically, our arguments consist of a logical component, a normative component and 
an empirical-hypothetical component. The logical component takes an “if-then”-form: If condition X 
obtains, then, by the logic of social choice theory, meaningful collective decisions are possible. The 
normative component defends the claim that the constraints required for bringing about condition X 
are inherent in or consistent with core elements of deliberative democracy. The empirical-hypothetical 
component, finally, seeks to render plausible the empirical hypothesis that deliberation facilitates the 
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emergence of condition X. While we provide empirical illustrations, more systematic testing is 
beyond our scope here.  
 
2. The Social-Choice-Theoretic Challenge 
 
 Before we explicate some of the impossibility results at the centre of the social-choice-
theoretic critique of democracy (2.2) and describe how they are usually invoked (2.3), we briefly 
sketch what we take to be the essence of social choice theory (2.1). 
 
2.1 Disentangling Social Choice Theory from Rational Choice Theory 
 
Social choice theory is a mathematical theory of group decision making. Its concern is not so 
much the empirical question of how groups actually do make decisions, rather the normative and 
logical questions of how they should, and could, aggregate information about the views, interests, or 
preferences of individuals into group decisions. The normative aspect is the specification of minimal 
conditions an acceptable aggregation mechanism must satisfy. The logical aspect is the identification 
of the class of logically possible aggregation mechanisms satisfying a given set of conditions. But the 
purely logical side of social choice theory will not favour one such set of conditions over another. 
Hence Riker’s argument that there is no popular will independent of a particular aggregation 
mechanism is not in itself a decisive challenge to democracy: without normative input in the form of a 
favoured set of conditions, it is impossible to design a social choice mechanism. One of the roles of 
deliberation is to seek agreement on such a set of conditions.  
 While social choice theorists often model individuals as self-interested utility maximizers,7 
there is no reason why the purely logical and normative analysis of aggregation mechanisms should 
presuppose any specific behavioural assumption. Social choice theory is, then, distinct from, and not 
committed to the premises of, rational choice theory.  
Nonetheless, an empirical account of individual behaviour may (implicitly) affect the 
normative choice of minimal conditions on aggregation. For instance, if, empirically, human beings 
tend to distort information when expedient, we may require that aggregation mechanisms minimize 
people's incentives to manipulate information (an example of such a condition is strategy-proofness as 
discussed below). Such rational-choice-theoretic premises may or may not turn out to be empirically 
adequate. Our point is simply that social choice theory and rational choice theory should not be 
conflated. 
 




 To introduce Arrow’s theorem, we recall Condorcet’s paradox of cyclical majority 
preferences. Suppose there are three individuals, labelled 1, 2 and 3, and three alternatives, labelled x, 
y and z, with the following preferences: 
individual 1: x > y > z 
individual 2: y > z > x 
individual 3: z > x > y 
Then there are majorities of 2 out of 3 individuals for x > y, for y > z and for z > x. The 
resulting majority preference ordering is cyclical: x > y > z > x.  
Arrow’s theorem generalizes Condorcet’s insight.8 We consider a set of individuals (e.g. 
voters, decision-makers, committee members), labelled N = {1, 2, ..., n}, and a set of alternatives (e.g. 
policy options, election candidates), labelled X = {x, y, z, ...}.9 To each individual, i, there corresponds 
a personal preference ordering, Ri, over the alternatives in X.10 A profile of personal preference 
orderings is an assignment of one such ordering to each individual, i.e. an n-tuple {Ri}i∈N. This 
formalism allows different interpretations: Ri could represent individual i’s explicitly expressed views 
or judgements or, alternatively, i’s interests as assessed by some external evaluation standard. 
Abbreviated, xRiy will be interpreted as "from individual i's perspective, x is at least as good as y". As 
a further abbreviation, we write xPiy if xRiy and not yRix. 
 A social welfare function (SWF) is an aggregation function F whose input is a profile of 
personal preference orderings and whose output is a social ordering R over the alternatives in X.11 xRy 
will be interpreted as "from the perspective of the group N, x is at least as good as y". We write xPy if 
xRy and not yRx.  
Pairwise majority voting is an example of a SWF. For each profile of personal preference 
orderings, the Condorcet ordering is the social ordering defined as follows: xRy if and only if the 
number of individuals with the preference xRiy is at least as great as the number of individuals with 
the preference yRix. Now pairwise majority voting is the function F mapping each {Ri}i∈N to the 
corresponding Condorcet ordering R. What Condorcet’s paradox shows is that pairwise majority 
voting may fail to generate transitive social orderings. Arrow’s theorem abstracts from pairwise 
majority voting, showing that there exists no other SWF, F, satisfying certain minimal conditions that 
generates transitive social preference orderings. Arrow’s conditions are as follows. Let R = F({Ri}i∈N). 
 
 Universal Domain (U). The domain of F is the set of all logically possible profiles of 
personal preference orderings. 
 




 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (I). The position of x relative to y in the social 
ordering R depends exclusively on the position of x relative to y in each of the personal preference 
orderings in {Ri}i∈N. 
 
 Non-Dictatorship (D). F is not dictatorial: there does not exist an i in N such that, for all 
{Ri}i∈N in the domain of F and all x and y in X, xPiy implies xPy. 
 
Theorem 1. There exists no SWF F (generating transitive social orderings) which satisfies 
(U), (P), (I) and (D).12 
  
 By Arrow's theorem, any SWF F will of logical necessity violate at least one of (U), (P), (I) 
and (D). Any democratic decision mechanism thus exhibits at least one of the following flaws: a 
failure to generate a determinate social ordering for certain profiles of personal preference orderings 
(if (U) is violated), inefficiency by sometimes ranking Pareto-suboptimal alternatives above Pareto-
optimal ones (if (P) is violated), manipulability by changes of the set of options X (the 'agenda') (if (I) 
is violated), or dictatorship (if (D) is violated). Moreover, relaxation of the requirement that social 
orderings be transitive does not solve the problem. The weaker requirement of quasi-transitivity may 
still give rise to a so-called oligarchy.13 
To state the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, define a social choice function (SCF) to be an 
aggregation function F whose input is a profile of personal preference orderings and whose output is a 
single winning alternative in X.14 Pairwise majority voting also provides an example of a SCF. A 
Condorcet winner is defined to be a top-ranked alternative in a Condorcet ordering. Now pairwise 
majority voting is the function F mapping each {Ri}i∈N to a corresponding Condorcet winner. In 
analogy to Arrow’s theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is concerned with SCFs in general, 
abstracting from pairwise majority voting. In addition to (U) and (D)15, two minimal conditions are 
imposed on a SCF F: 
 
 The Range-Constraint (R). The range of F contains at least three distinct alternatives in X. 
 
 F is manipulable by individual i at the profile {Ri}i∈N if the following condition holds:  
 
Strategic Incentives (SI). If i submits a false preference ordering R'i (where R'i≠Ri), then F 
selects an alternative y' that is strictly better from the perspective of i's true preference ordering than 
the alternative y that would be selected by F if i submitted the true preference ordering Ri – formally 




 Strategy-Proofness (S). There does not exist a profile {Ri}i∈N at which F is manipulable by 
some i in N. 
 
 As indicated in section 2.1, (S) is a (normative) condition whose appeal is closely linked with 
an empirical assumption. If, empirically, individuals act on the incentives for manipulation provided 
by situations of type (SI), then a condition that rules out the occurrence of such situations, namely 
condition (S), is normatively attractive. In section 3.2, we challenge the plausibility of this empirical 
assumption in a deliberative setting. 
 
 Theorem 2. There exists no SCF F which satisfies (U), (R), (D) and (S).16 
 
 By the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, any SCF will violate at least one of (U), (R), (D) and 
(S). Given any SCF F, at least one of the following flaws thus seems inevitable: a failure to generate a 
determinate winning alternative for certain profiles of personal preference orderings (if (U) is 
violated), insensitivity to individuals’ views, interests, or preferences (if (R) is violated), dictatorship 
(if (D) is violated), strategic manipulability (if (S) is violated). 
 The problem of strategic manipulation becomes even more intractable if we allow the 
possibility of counterthreats of the form "if you submit false preferences, then so will I/we".17 A SCF 
violating (S) can then create perverse incentives in the form of a prisoners’ dilemma. Suppose F is 
manipulable by individual i at {Ri}i∈N, and suppose a coalition M of other individuals states a 
counterthreat against i’s manipulation to submit false preferences themselves. If the incentives for 
individual i and coalition M are as shown in table 1, then the dominant strategy for everyone is to 
submit false preferences, and the (unique) Nash equilibrium is the bottom right-hand box of the 
payoff matrix. However, everyone would be better off submitting true preferences. If such a situation 
can occur, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem clearly poses a significant challenge to democracy.18 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
2.3 Two Ways to Deploy Impossibility Arguments 
 
 In the sporadic encounters between deliberative democracy and social choice theory, the 
Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems have been deployed to support diametrically opposed 
positions.   
 From the direction of deliberative democracy, Sunstein argues, citing Arrow, that “it is 
doubtful that private desires or even aspirations can be well-aggregated through the process of 
majority rule”, thus proving the necessity for deliberation across those holding initially different 
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preferences.19 But this invocation merely asserts deliberation's superiority through reference to the 
problems of aggregation; it does not show why deliberation avoids the same problems. Elster holds 
that under deliberation “there would not be any need for an aggregating mechanism, since a rational 
discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences.”20 However, it is surely overly optimistic to 
expect that rational discussion will always produce unanimity, so even after discussion-induced 
preference changes aggregation of conflicting preferences may be necessary. Miller argues that 
deliberation produces preference profiles that satisfy single-peakedness,21 a structure condition to be 
discussed below. He further suggests that if the basic cause of cycling is the combination of several 
normative dimensions into a single vote or choice, then deliberation can unpack the various 
dimensions. Deliberators can search for acceptable choices on each dimension, then aggregate these 
choices into a coherent collective choice. Miller’s argument points in the right direction, but requires 
further elaboration. Below we will address his hypothesis that deliberation induces single-peakedness 
in greater detail, and we will argue that disaggregation helps only under specific conditions.  
From the direction of social choice theory, followers of Riker have argued that Arrow 
problems devastate deliberation, because deliberative democrats prescribe a procedure as open as 
possible in allowing different viewpoints and as free as possible from constraints imposed by rules 
and inequalities. But these are exactly the conditions of structurelessness conducive to impossibility, 
instability and strategic manipulability in collective choice.22 Regarding the Gibbard-Satterthwaite 
theorem, deliberation might even exacerbate strategic behaviour. For effective manipulation requires 
information about others’ preferences, and deliberation can supply such information. In short, the 
prescriptions of deliberative democrats are likely only to make collective choice more intractable.  
Knight and Johnson recognize that “the standard claim that deliberation aims at preference 
transformation appears … either too strong or beside the point. It is too strong if it requires 
convergent, homogeneous preferences.” And they point out – along the lines of Miller’s hypothesis – 
that “if voters can agree about the dimension over which they disagree … majority rule need not 
generate cyclical social orderings”, where agreement about the dimension of disagreement is 
interpreted as single-peakedness.23 But Knight and Johnson are less optimistic than Miller on whether 
such agreement can be achieved in practice, arguing that openness and freedom of communication 
within the forum will "unsettle, if not altogether subvert, any extant shared understanding of political 
conflict".24 Against this interpretation of the conditions of deliberation as lack of structure, we argue 
that there are "structuration" processes endogenous to deliberation that can speak to the problems 
highlighted by social choice theory.  
 




 Each condition of Arrow's theorem and of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem points towards 
a potential escape-route from the impossibility problems. If any one of these conditions is relaxed, 
there exist social choice procedures satisfying all the others, and such procedures can, in principle, be 
employed in democratic decision making. The problem, according to social-choice-theoretic critics, is 
that all these conditions are so basic that weakening even one would yield undesirable consequences. 
If we relax (I) or (S), for example, we would solve the impossibility problems seemingly at the 
expense of, respectively, possible agenda manipulation or possible submission of false preferences. 
However, we argue in sections 3.2 to 3.4 that a relaxation of each of (S), (U) and (I) is an option in a 
deliberative setting. In section 3.5 we discuss an escape-route from Arrow's theorem that is – at first 
sight surprisingly – consistent with all of Arrow's conditions. 
We explained above that our arguments consist of a logical “if-then” component, a normative 
component and an empirical-hypothetical component. The "if-then" component is given by social-
choice-theoretic possibility results. The aim of deliberation must then be to impose certain constraints 
on democratic decision processes required for satisfying the antecedents of these "if-then" results. The 
normative component of our arguments defends the use of these constraints as consistent with, or 
even inherent in, deliberation. In some of our arguments, particularly those in sections 3.4 and 3.5, the 
recognition that the requisite constraints could be consistently implemented in the institutions of a 
deliberative democracy does most of the work – whether they will be implemented is of course a 
different matter. Other arguments, particularly those in sections 3.2 and 3.3, depend more crucially on 
empirical hypotheses, which require further empirical corroboration. 
But first we introduce some conceptual tools to classify aggregation problems and those 
aspects of deliberation that can be brought to bear. 
 
3.1 A Simple Taxonomy of Decision Processes in a Deliberative Democracy 
 
We use two (purely formal) criteria for the classification of aggregation problems that fit our 
description of social choice theory:25 
(i) What is the input of the aggregation?  
J Views or judgements of individuals, as explicitly expressed by them (e.g. by 
voting), or 
I Interests or the welfare of individuals, as assessed by some external standard 
(e.g. by an index of a person's socio-economic welfare). 
(ii) What is the output of the aggregation? 
D A decision, or 
W A welfare judgement. 
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Of the four possible combinations of these criteria, JD and ID are most relevant to the theory 
of democracy. It is helpful to subdivide the category JD further by the following criteria: 
(iii) Are the individuals’ views and judgements subjected to  
n no deliberation, or 
d deliberation 
prior to the actual decision? 
(iv) Are the individuals’ views and judgements expressed 
v by (anonymous) voting, or 
d in a group discussion  
when the decision is finally taken? 
There are now four sub-categories of JD: JD-nv, JD-nd, JD-dv, and JD-dd. In reality, criteria 
(iii) and (iv) admit a continuum of possibilities between n and d and between v and d, respectively. 
Category JD-nv represents the (rare) limiting case of pure aggregative decision making, in which no 
discussion is involved in the formation of people’s views and judgements. Category JD-dd represents 
the pure deliberative case, in which people frame, revise and express their views and judgements in a 
reasoned discussion leading to an appropriate (consensus) decision. Deliberative democrats consider 
processes of type JD-dd more desirable than processes of type JD-nv, but they need not banish voting-
based processes. Unlike purely aggregative democrats, however, they do not treat views and 
preferences as exogenously given. Category JD-dv may seem desirable if the number of decision-
makers is large or if individual decision-makers are to be protected against social coercion. Fishkin‘s 
deliberative opinion polls can be interpreted as a version of JD-dv.26 Participants first express their 
views by filling out confidential questionnaires, then they deliberate, and finally they express their 
views again in the same questionnaires. Category JD-nd, finally, seems unrealistic: it represents the 
limiting case in which a decision is made on the basis of views and judgements expressed in group 
communication, with no discussion. Perhaps group discussion in what Gambetta calls a “Claro!” 
culture could take this form, where highly opinionated agents are unwilling as a matter of “discursive 
machismo” to subject their ideas to deliberative scrutiny.27 However, this outcome would be 
contingent on substantial immediate agreement among the agents on what is obviously right (“Claro!” 
is a conversational putdown that translates as “Obvious!”). 
Deliberative democrats highlight JD-dv and JD-dd – we discuss such decision problems in 
sections 3.2 to 3.4. Yet deliberation can focus not only on first-order decisions concerning specific 
outcomes, but also on second-order decisions concerning institutional arrangements, for instance 
concerning taxation or welfare provision. Deliberation could reach agreement on the choice of some 
interpersonally significant standard for assessing people’s interests or welfare (e.g. Rawlsian primary 
goods). On the basis of such a standard, the relevant decision and distribution problems can be 
interpreted as type ID – section 3.5 discusses such decision problems.  
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How may deliberation affect people’s preferences, views, judgements and social dispositions? 
Deliberation has informational (inf), argumentative (arg), reflective (ref) and social (soc) aspects. It 
can 
(inf)  confront people with new facts, new information or new perspectives on a given 
issue, as well as corroborate or falsify previously believed facts, information or 
perspectives; 
(arg)  draw people’s attention to new arguments about the interdependence of issues, 
confirm or refute the internal consistency of such arguments, make explicit 
previously hidden premises and assumptions, and clarify whether controversies are 
about facts, methods and means, or values and ends; 
(ref)  induce people to reflect on their preferences, in the knowledge that these preferences 
have to be justified to others; 
(soc)  create a situation of social interaction where people talk and listen to each other, 
enabling each person to recognize their interrelation with a social group. 
We suggest that each of these aspects plays a role in facilitating the solution of social-choice-
theoretic problems.  
 
3.2 Relaxing Strategy-Proofness 
  
 In this section we propose the empirical hypothesis that  
Hypothesis 1. Group deliberation induces individuals to reveal their preferences and views 
truthfully.  
The hypothesis responds, first, to the attempt to dismiss talk as inconsequential or even 
directly counterproductive in collective decision-making and, second, to the challenge of the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem, according to which the non-existence of SCFs satisfying (S) (together with 
(U), (R), (D)) implies the inherent vulnerability of democracy to strategic manipulation. If the 
hypothesis is correct, then a relaxation of condition (S) becomes an option: the existence of profiles 
which – in the formal sense of the definition of manipulability in section 2.2 – provide an incentive to 
submit false preferences poses no problem if individuals do not act on that incentive, i.e. if they have 
a disposition to be truthful. And, if we relax condition (S), then there are aggregation mechanisms 
satisfying other reasonable conditions (e.g. (U), (R) and (D)) and generating determinate winning 
alternatives.28 
 To defend the plausibility of the proposed hypothesis, let us briefly recall what the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem implies. Any SCF satisfying (U), (R) and (D) will violate (S), and hence there 
will exist situations with property (SI): An individual is better off from the perspective of their true 
preferences if they reveal false preferences than if they reveal their true preferences.  
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We argue that deliberation can have (at least) one of two effects:  
Effect 1: Explicitly changing the incentives. In a deliberative setting, there may be risks and 
penalties attached to informational deception and false disclosure of preferences, i.e. untruthfulness 
may be costly, and hence an individual may no longer be better off if they reveal false preferences. 
Thus deliberation may transform situations in which, without deliberation, property (SI) would hold 
into ones in which property (SI) no longer holds. 
Effect 2: Inducing in individuals a greater cooperative disposition. We have noted in section 
2.2 that, when property (SI) holds, decisions about whether or not to submit true preferences may 
have a structure similar to a (one-shot) prisoners’ dilemma, where truthfulness corresponds to 
cooperation and submission of false preferences corresponds to defection. Deliberation may increase 
the likelihood that individuals will cooperate, i.e. that they will submit true preferences, and hence 
that they will no longer act on the incentives provided by (SI).  
We now address the two effects in greater detail. Let us first consider effect 1. From a 
rational-choice standpoint, Austen-Smith analyses talk in strategic terms: it can convey information, 
but never change preferences, which are prior and exogenous to the decision process.29 Information 
conveyed in talk is selective and possibly false, "potentially influential only insofar as it alters 
individuals' beliefs about how actions map onto consequences".30 Listeners are aware of the 
possibility of deception, and so calculate whether or not to believe speakers. If there are no 
punishments for being exposed as a liar, then there are no incentives for truthfulness. 
 However, if interaction is recurrent, there are penalties for being exposed as a liar; nobody 
will believe you the next time.31 The incentives for truthfulness created by recurrent interaction 
parallel the incentives for cooperation in repeated (as opposed to one-shot) prisoners’ dilemmas.32 
But even in one-shot interactions a deliberative setting may create incentives for truthfulness. 
Austen-Smith stresses the informational (inf) aspect of deliberation and how agents will calculate 
what information to believe, to manipulate and to reveal. First, introducing multiple speakers helps to 
create incentives for truthfulness by enabling corroboration of information.33 Second, beyond the 
informational (inf) aspect of deliberation, the argumentative (arg) and reflective (ref) aspects actually 
constrain the individuals’ opportunities for manipulation.  
Consider, for instance, a truly canny actor i intent on taking advantage of the deliberative 
revelation of preferences by others, while “hanging back” to disclose his/her own preferences 
selectively and possibly deceptively. Suppose i’s true preference ordering is xPiyPiz. After listening to 
others reveal their preferences, i perceives that x has a better chance of beating z than beating y, so i 
then pretends to have an ordering xPizPiy.  However, the reflective (ref) aspect of deliberation means 
that i must justify this false ordering. There is a risk that the others will not believe that i is sincere. 
The best case that i can make for revealing the preference ordering xPizPiy late in the day is that 
he/she has been persuaded of this ordering by the preceding deliberation. Yet such a lie is risky, 
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because the content of deliberation has actually advanced the standing of y, not z – otherwise there 
would be no reason for i to act strategically against y here. In short, the reflective (ref) aspect of 
deliberation constrains strategic and deceptive disclosure of preferences.  
Now, it might be argued that in partisan settings (such as a legislature) skilful prevarication 
may actually be admired, at least by members of one’s own side, outweighing any incentives to 
truthfulness. But effect 1 holds to the degree the setting has any deliberative aspects at all – 
prevaricators risk destruction of their stock of credibility, which in turn is necessary to make any 
effective deliberative interventions. Assemblies are only completely partisan in political systems on 
the verge of disintegration. Thus effect 1 works in “adversary” and “unitary” democracies alike, in 
Mansbridge’s classification.34 
In our discussion of effect 2, we will now address a different mechanism that may induce 
truthfulness in one-shot interactions. We argue that deliberation’s social (soc) aspect may promote the 
individuals’ cooperative disposition. A robust empirical finding in experiments on one-shot prisoners’ 
dilemmas is that a period of discussion within the group prior to each individual choice between 
cooperation and defection increases the proportion of cooperative choice.35 This result falsifies the 
rational-choice prediction that individuals should still defect, because the payoff structure of the 
choice situation is unchanged by discussion: indeed, the more confident any one individual becomes 
during this discussion that others will cooperate, the more that person should calculate that the payoff 
from defection will increase. 
 How do we explain discussion-induced cooperation? Discussion provides participants with 
opportunities for multi-lateral promise-making about the choices they will make.36 Rational choice 
theory would predict that in one-shot interactions such promises will be broken, but empirical 
evidence suggests that social norms and/or psychological dispositions in favour of keeping promises 
are more powerful. Even when experimental conditions are modified to ensure that the discussion is 
on topics irrelevant to the choice between cooperation and defection, thus ruling out explicit promise-
making, discussion still increases the proportion of cooperators. Proposed explanations range from an 
evolutionary-psychological or social trust mechanism, by which exposing one’s vulnerability to 
others makes it less likely that they will exploit that vulnerability37, to the idea that people are trust-
responsive because there is a positive payoff in being seen by others as cooperative and trustworthy.38 
 Is evidence from stylized dilemma games relevant to the real world of deliberation, 
particularly its social aspect (soc)? A decision-theoretic explanation of how cooperation can be 
triggered even in one-shot interactions suggests a mechanism that may work in both laboratories and 
the real world. People’s preferences are not description invariant: an agent’s preferences depend not 
only on a decontextualized payoff matrix, but also on a decision-frame, “the decision-maker’s 
conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice”.39 Varying an 
agent’s frame can lead to major preference changes, up to complete reversal.40 People express less 
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self-regarding preferences in games framed in social contexts than in games framed in market 
contexts.41 The cooperative disposition of an agent is also connected with the question of whether the 
agent conceptualizes a given situation in terms of an “I”-frame of self-interest, or a “we”-frame of 
collective interest.42 Experimental conditions as undemanding as asking subjects to edit a text by 
circling all occurrences of “we”, “us” and “our” have been shown to induce use of the “we”-frame.43 
We hypothesize that deliberation can have a similar effect of making a “we”-frame of collective 
interest focal; and that this effect can still occur in adversarial settings, provided only that they have 
some deliberative component. 
There is, then, some evidence in support of hypothesis 1: we may expect deliberative talk to 
be truthful rather than manipulative. And we have argued that, if hypothesis 1 is correct, then this 
would open up an escape-route from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. 
 
3.3 Relaxing Universal Domain  
 
 The threat Arrow’s problem poses to democratic decision-making depends on the level of 
diversity across different individuals’ preferences. In (rare) cases of unanimity, aggregation is easy. 
But, as noted above, it is overly optimistic to expect deliberation to produce unanimity. Moreover, 
while unanimity is a sufficient condition for avoiding Arrow’s problem, it is not a necessary one; 
preference structuration, exemplified by Black’s condition of single-peakedness,44 is already a 
sufficient condition. We will discuss the implications of this observation for deliberative democracy. 
 A profile {Ri}i∈N of personal preference orderings is single-peaked if there exists a single 
ordering of all alternatives from 'left'-most to 'right'-most such that each individual has a most 
preferred position on that 'left'/'right' ordering with decreasing preference for alternatives as they get 
increasingly distant from the most preferred position. A ‘left’/’right’ ordering with this property will 
be a called a dimension, labelled Ω. 
 
Single-Peakedness. There exists a bijection Ω : X → {1, 2, ..., k} such that, for every triple of 
alternatives x, y, z and every individual i, if (Ω(x) < Ω(y) < Ω(z)) or (Ω(z) < Ω(y) < Ω(x)), then xRiy 
implies xPiz. 
 
 Table 2 gives an example of two preference orderings over the alternatives x, y, z, v, w which 
are single-peaked with respect to the same dimension Ω (ordering the alternatives from ‘left’ to ‘right’ 
in the order x, z, v, y, w). 
 




Let DS denote the set of all profiles of personal preference orderings satisfying single-
peakedness.  
 
Theorem 3. If the number of individuals n is odd45, there exists a Condorcet winner for each 
profile contained in DS.46 
 
Theorem 4. If the number of individuals n is odd, there exist SWFs on the domain DS 
satisfying (P), (I) and (D), specifically pairwise majority voting.47 
 
 Theorem 5. If the number of individuals n is odd, there exist SCFs on the domain D*S 
satisfying (R), (D) and (S) (where D*S contains all profiles of strict orderings in DS),48 specifically 
pairwise majority voting.49  
 
 The possibility results of theorems 3, 4 and 5 still hold if DS is replaced by DV, where DV is 
the set of all profiles of personal preference orderings satisfying the more general (and less 
demanding) structure condition of value-restriction.50  
Further, while full single-peakedness is sufficient for the existence of SWFs satisfying (P), (I), 
(D) and of SCFs satisfying (R), (D), (S), it is not necessary. Profiles with sufficiently large single-
peaked subprofiles can be included in the domain as well. Niemi has shown that, depending on the 
total number of individuals, transitive social orderings satisfying the conditions of Arrow’s theorem 
(and by easy implication, the conditions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem) are likely to exist if 
only 75% or even fewer of the individuals have personal preference orderings that are structured by 
the same dimension.51 
Single-peakedness can be related to a distinction between two different concepts of 
agreement: agreement at a substantive level and agreement at a meta-level.52 Two or more individuals 
agree at a substantive level to the extent that their preferences are the same – the perfect case being 
unanimity. But it is also possible for two or more individuals to disagree on how to rank alternatives, 
and yet to agree on a common dimension in terms of which the alternatives are to be conceptualized. 
Such agreement is called agreement at a meta-level. Agreement at a meta-level may imply single-
peakedness. If different individuals agree on a common dimension along which each individual’s 
preferences are systematically aligned in the requisite way, then the profile of preferences orderings 
across these individuals satisfies single-peakedness.53  
 In section 3.3.1 we discuss mechanisms whereby deliberation might induce greater 
(unidimensional) single-peakedness, via agreement at a meta-level. Allowing that issue-complexity or 
normative disagreement may often rule out agreement on a common dimension, section 3.3.2 
addresses the possibility that identifying multiple relevant issue-dimensions and determining people’s 
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separate dimension-specific preference orderings may generate intra-dimensional single-peakedness, 
and provide a partial solution to Arrow’s problem. Because the present escape-route from Arrow’s 
problem rests on empirical hypotheses, section 3.3.3 discusses empirical evidence.54  
 
3.3.1 One Dimensional Preference Structuration 
 
In this section, we discuss the hypothesis that 
 Hypothesis 2. The profile of personal preference orderings {Ri}i∈N after a period of group 
deliberation will satisfy (or approximate) single-peakedness.55 
It might be argued that rationality requires one determinate dimension on which preferences 
are single-peaked, whose identification enables a group to criticize as irrational personal preference 
orderings which have more than one peak on that dimension. As most individuals would eschew 
appearing irrational, this itself might induce single-peakedness. However, someone may have good 
reasons for having preferences with more than one peak on the identified dimension; this individual’s 
preferences may be single-peaked along a different, but still reasonably explicable, dimension. 
Consider a preference ordering in the United States concerning the Vietnam War, preferring massive 
military action to withdrawal to limited action. If the relevant dimension is extent of military action, 
the ordering violates single-peakedness. But if the relevant dimension is expected net gain of military 
action, this ordering is single-peaked. Unless deliberation can produce agreement on one dimension as 
exclusively relevant, appeal to rationality alone cannot induce single-peakedness. 
However, there are other noncoercive ways in which deliberation can narrow the domain of 
actually occurring preference profiles. Deliberation may rule out arguments that cannot withstand 
deliberative scrutiny. Deliberative theorists often stress the invocation of interests “generalizable” to 
deliberators, and to their society. Arguments couched in such terms are more persuasive than those 
couched in terms of the interests of some subgroup, which in turn are more persuasive than those 
couched in terms of the interests of specific individuals.56 Preference orderings denying the personal 
integrity and political equality of other actual or potential deliberators are not easily sustained, for 
participation in deliberation has to bring to mind the interests of these others.57 One kind of 
generalizable interest is the economist’s idea of a public good, which can only be supplied jointly and 
indivisibly to all individuals, such as ecological integrity. Another kind is access to the basic needs of 
life (food, shelter, education etc.), formalizable in Sen’s notion of functionings or in Rawls’s notion of 
primary goods (on such ‘divisible’ kinds of generalizable interest, see section 3.5). 
 But is an appeal to a generalizable interest sufficient to induce (a greater level of) single-
peakedness? We suggest that, if, through deliberation, (i) a particular generalizable interest becomes 
focal and (ii) this generalizable interest can be associated with a single dimension, then (a high level 
of) single-peakedness is a likely consequence.58  
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The mechanism can be described as follows. The reflective (ref) and social (soc) aspects of 
deliberation may lead people to re-frame a given decision problem in terms of a generalizable interest. 
Supposing (for the moment) this generalizable interest is associated with a single dimension (e.g. 
ecological sustainability), then the informational (inf) and argumentative (arg) aspects of deliberation 
may resolve factual disagreements on how alternatives are aligned on that dimension (e.g. which 
options least or most degrade an ecosystem). Rationality may finally lead individuals to have single-
peaked preferences on the shared dimension. This mechanism requires only agreement at a meta-level 
(i.e. on a shared dimension), not at a substantive level (i.e. on the most preferred position on that 
dimension).59  
A sceptic might counter that invocations of generalizable interests are just rationalizations for 
self-interest. So Riker castigates, for example, “an assertion of the general virtue of rural life on the 
family farm [that] justifies farm subsidies.”60 Yet rationalization can still shift debate to a single 
publicly-sustainable issue-dimension. On farm subsidies, a deliberator might question with regard to 
this dimension why subsidies should also go to large agribusinesses. Imagine three policy alternatives: 
x = subsidies for all farms, y = subsidies for family farms only, z = no subsidies. Assuming material 
self-interest, the preference ordering for agribusiness is xPizPiy (z is preferred to y because subsidies 
for family farms only would hurt the competitive position of agribusiness), for family farmers yPixPiz, 
and for taxpayers zPiyPix. If none of the three groups controls a majority but each pair of them does, 
then there is a cycle across x, y and z. But if deliberation induces a need for rationalization along 
Riker’s lines, agribusiness’s preference ordering cannot be sustained, and the cycle is broken. In short, 
deliberation-induced rationalization may narrow the domain of preference profiles. 
Elster speaks of the "civilizing force of hypocrisy" accompanying deliberation.61 Perhaps 
becoming civilized in Elster's terms involves 'finding one's peak' on the publicly identified issue-
dimension. A more sanguine view of motivation would see individuals truly adopt positions they can 
sustain publicly.62 Even if individuals privately cling to their original preference orderings, proposals 
are likely to be crafted only in response to publicly sustainable orderings.63 
To illustrate, consider the preference ordering of an individual selected as one of the 
mandated environmental representatives on the Resource Advisory Council for Eastern Washington 
set up by the Federal Bureau of Land Management under the Rangeland Reform of 1995. His 
background, and arrest record, was in the radical environmental group Earth First!, whose slogan is 
“No compromise in defense of Mother Earth!”. The Earth First! preference ordering violates single-
peakedness with respect to the dimension “extent of wilderness preservation”: members prefer 
wilderness preservation to desecration to compromise development, on the grounds that once it loses 
its pristine character, wilderness might as well be trashed to drive home the point. Participating in this 
deliberative forum, this Earth First!er eventually co-wrote (along with a cattle rancher) most of the 
Guidelines for Range Management produced by the Council.64 No doubt preservation remained his 
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first choice, but compromise was now preferred to desecration. Thus this individual found his peak – 
and lost his pique. 
A skeptic could allow that, for JD-dv situations, individuals might indeed be constrained in 
their public expression of preference orderings – yet still vote based on different private preference 
orderings. If so, our proposed mechanisms would ultimately provide no solution to Arrow’s problem 
via single-peakedness. However, a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for this objection is 
that voting be secret. When voting is public, it is implausible that individuals would vote one way 
while simultaneously talking another way; as we argued in section 3.2, individuals who engage in 
such perceived deception are penalized in deliberation. As Brennan and Pettit point out, “unveiling 
the vote” induces individuals to vote in “discursively defensible manner”.65 But even in JD-dv 
situations with secret voting, the social aspect (soc) of deliberation may induce a cooperative 
disposition towards expressing publicly oriented rather than self-regarding preferences (see section 
3.2). As we note in section 3.3.3, this claim is supported by empirical evidence from Fishkin’s 
deliberative polls. 
 The present arguments are applicable if deliberation leads to the identification of a single 
shared dimension. Issue complexity may rule this out. Rational choice theorists might agree that the 
demanding part of our argument is not the claim that a focus on a single dimension would induce 
single-peakedness, but rather the antecedent condition: as Mueller holds, "[g]iven that we have a 
single-dimensional issue, single-peakedness does not seem to be that strong an assumption. What is 
implausible is the assumption that the issue space is one dimensional".66 Even a deliberation-induced 
focus on “generalizable interests” does not necessarily solve the problem, for individuals might still 
disagree about what is in the public interest, or whether (say) ecological integrity or economic growth 
should receive priority when these public interests clash. 
 However, as we see in section 3.3.3, empirical evidence supports hypothesis 1 – even in its 
above stated onedimensional form. 
 
3.3.2 Multidimensional Preference Structuration 
 
As we argued in section 3.3.1, if preferences focus on a single dimension, then single-
peakedness is not a demanding requirement. Thus if a profile of personal preference orderings {Ri}i∈N 
violates single-peakedness, the reason might be that preferences are determined by more than one 
dimension. This leads us to propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3.  
(i) Group deliberation leads to the identification of those issue-dimensions that are considered relevant 




(ii) For each individual i in N, i’s preferences can be represented by (a) a vector <Ri1, Ri2, ..., Rik> of 
dimension-specific preferences, where, for each dimension j, the ordering Rij represents individual i’s 
preferences with respect to dimension j, and (b) a specification of the relative importance individual i 
attaches to each of the k dimensions (the disaggregation condition).67 
(iii) For each dimension j, the corresponding dimension-specific profile of personal preference 
orderings across individuals, {Rij}i∈N = {R1j, R2j, …, Rnj}, after a period of group deliberation will 
satisfy (or approximate) single-peakedness (the intradimensional single-peakedness condition).68 
Why is the hypothesis plausible? Firstly, in deliberation one must give reasons for preferences 
or appeal to generalizable interests, and this itself is conducive to the identification of relevant issue-
dimensions. These dimensions may be uncovered by, or created through, deliberation; empirically, it 
is hard to distinguish between these two possibilities. Secondly, if deliberation can disaggregate a 
profile {Ri}i∈N into k separate profiles {Ri1}i∈N, {Ri2}i∈N, ..., {Rik}i∈N, each focusing only on a single 
issue-dimension, each such dimension-specific profile is more likely to be single-peaked than the 
original profile. Disagreements about issue-priorities are by definition ‘factored out’ in each 
dimension-specific profile, and hence there is less potential for the type of disagreement leading to 
violations of single-peakedness in each dimension-specific profile. The mechanisms identified in 
section 3.3.1 are thus likely to be effective for each dimension-specific profile, because their 
antecedent condition – namely the focus on a single dimension – is satisfied.  
To illustrate, imagine a committee having difficulties deciding what level of tariffs to impose 
on imports. One person claims a first preference for free trade, a second preference for a blanket tariff, 
a third preference for a selective tariff. Upon questioning, she might say that she prefers zero to 
blanket to selective tariffs because a selective tariff will cause inequity across industrial sectors. Thus 
she reveals two dimensions: open/closed trade and equity/inequity – with a greater importance placed 
on the former – on both of which her preference ordering has only one peak. Other members might 
then rank their preferences on both these dimensions, producing a single-peaked profile on each 
dimension (assuming no complications from these other preference orderings). They still face the 
problem of aggregation across these two dimensions, but we turn to this issue below. 
Given the intradimensional single-peakedness condition of hypothesis 3, theorems 4 and 5 
imply that separate dimension-specific aggregation can yield a social ordering or a socially most 
preferred alternative (particularly, a Condorcet winner) for each dimension in accordance with 
Arrow's conditions (I), (P), (D) or the Gibbard-Satterthwaite conditions (R), (D) and (S). 
There are at least four ways in which dimension-specific aggregation can help solve a 
collective decision problem.  
Subdividing the decision. For decision problems which can be subdivided into several 
independent dimension-specific sub-decisions, identification of the dimensions of these sub-decisions 
and subsequent dimension-specific aggregation might be sufficient, provided that the relevance of 
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each of these dimensions is publicly accepted and that deliberation can induce sufficient single-
peakedness in each dimension-specific preference profile. To illustrate, it has long been observed in 
negotiations that an issue can be made more tractable by the introduction of multiple dimensions. The 
peace process in Northern Ireland follows such a course. If confined to the single dimension of 
sovereignty, the issue is intractable, with effective majorities of key actors against every conceivable 
alternative. But once dimensions are introduced such as amnesty for politically motivated crimes, civil 
rights, cross-border bodies, electoral systems, guaranteed representation for particular groups, an 
effective super-majority for a settlement could be constituted.  
Lexicographic hierarchies of dimensions. Often decisions come in 'packages' and cannot 
easily be subdivided into separate dimension-specific sub-decisions such as one on amnesty, one on 
civil rights, one on electoral systems, etc. In such cases, mere unpacking of dimensions does not solve 
the problem of what overall decision to take. While people may agree on how alternatives are aligned 
on the dimensions of (a) ecological sustainability, (b) employment, and (c) economic growth, they 
may still disagree on the relative importance of each dimension. In the most general case, the problem 
of aggregating k dimension-specific profiles into a single social ordering, rather than into k 
dimension-specific orderings, raises problems similar to Arrow's problem, even if each dimension-
specific profile satisfies single-peakedness.  
Theorem 6.69 Let F be an aggregation function whose input is a vector of k dimension-
specific profiles of personal preference orderings <{Ri1}i∈N, {Ri2}i∈N, ..., {Rik}i∈N> and whose output is 
a social ordering R over the alternatives in X. Suppose F is defined for all vectors of dimension-
specific profiles where each dimension-specific profile satisfies single-peakedness (i.e. the domain 
that would result from hypothesis 3), and suppose F satisfies (P) and (I).70 Then F will make one 
dimension dominant: there exists a fixed dimension j such that, for all inputs in the domain of F and 
all x and y in X, if all individuals rank x above y in dimension j – i.e. xPijy for all i –, then xPy. 
The only aggregation functions satisfying the conditions of theorem 6 are (possibly 
lexicographic) hierarchies of dimensions. The overall social ordering is determined, first, exclusively 
on the basis of the dimension-specific profile {Rij}i∈N corresponding to the highest-ranked dimension; 
only if there are ties, the dimension-specific profile corresponding to the second-highest-ranked 
dimension acts as a tie-breaker; only if there are still ties, the dimension-specific profile 
corresponding to the third-highest ranked dimension acts as a tie-breaker, and so on. A lexicographic 
hierarchy of dimensions might solve collective decision problems when deliberation can generate 
agreement on a lexicographic order of importance of different issue-dimensions. In particular, the 
weights the individuals attach to each issue-dimension could be aggregated into such an overall 
lexicographic ordering.71 But this aggregation problem is not immune to the Arrow and Gibbard-
Satterthwaite problems either, and democracies may feel apprehensive about solving cross-
dimensional aggregation problems involving difficult matters of issue-priority by a mechanical 
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decision procedure. Still, one could imagine debate on the relative weights of the dimensions of (say) 
ecology, employment and business. Because people’s views on such weights are as changeable by 
deliberation as their preferences on alternatives, deliberation might produce agreement on a 
lexicographic hierarchy. 
 Logrolling. In practice, problems of cross-dimensional aggregation are often solved by 
logrolling rather than by explicit assignment of weights to dimensions. Under logrolling, intense 
minorities, as potential coalition partners in a majority coalition, can get their way on particular 
dimensions by threatening to block overall agreement. From a manipulability perspective, logrolling 
provides opportunities for misrepresentation of preference intensity. From a rational-choice 
perspective, it is excoriated for enabling coalitions of special interests to prevail over general interests. 
But logrolling also provides information about preference intensity72 and thus about what weights 
agents attach to different issue-dimensions. In deliberation, especially given (arg) and (ref), 
individuals have to justify their preferences in terms acceptable to others. One such way of justifying 
preference intensity is for an individual to indicate what he/she would be prepared to accept on other 
dimensions in return for getting his/her way on the dimension he/she cares about most. While this 
individual might still misrepresent this intensity, as we saw in section 3.2 lying about one’s own 
preferences is potentially costly in deliberation. 
 Demonstrating the nature of the problem and crafting new alternatives. Even if there is no 
straightforward solution to the cross-dimensional aggregation problem, the identification of the 
precise nature of the problem at issue, as offered by social-choice-theoretic analysis, is much more 
desirable than mere recognition of inconsistency as a result of a lack of structure in individual 
preferences. If at this juncture a seeming impasse is reached, at least two different conclusions can be 
drawn. One is that the information contained in the available profile(s) of personal preference 
orderings (even after unpacking issue-dimensions) is insufficient for reaching a decision in 
accordance with Arrow’s conditions73 – see section 3.5. Alternatively, the information from 
unpacking dimensions could be used to craft new alternatives, not yet contained in X. In our tariff 
example, the committee might, for instance, think about compensatory taxes and subsidies that would 
restore equity across industrial sectors should a selective tariff be adopted, or contemplate ways a 
non-discriminatory restricted tariff could be designed.74 
 
3.3.3 Empirical Evidence 
 
Although the empirical evidence on how deliberation affects preference structuration is 
limited, some recent findings corroborate our hypotheses in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.  
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On the hypothesis that deliberation can increase endorsement of "generalizable interests", 
Gundersen, reporting a series of “deliberative interviews” on environmental issues, finds that in every 
case deliberation promoted commitment to the generalizable interest of ecological integrity.75 
On the hypothesis that deliberation induces greater single-peakedness, Pelletier et al 
administered Q-sorts to participants before and after a deliberative "search conference" on food 
supply policy in upstate New York.76 Although this study does not measure single-peakedness as 
such, one result is that individuals who subscribed to two distinct positions before deliberation tended 
to subscribe to one or other of them (but not both) after deliberation.77 This might suggest that 
deliberation leads individuals to identify more closely with their "peak". Fishkin’s deliberative polls 
provide data for testing the hypothesis that preferences after deliberation exhibit a greater level of 
single-peakedness than preferences before deliberation. Fishkin’s own research indicated that 
deliberation induces substantial preference shifts. The significance of these shifts for single-
peakedness in the unidimensional sense is investigated by List, McLean, Fishkin and Luskin.78 Two 
indices of single-peakedness are applied to individual preference data collected before and after 
deliberation. For several deliberative polls on Texas energy policy, deliberation substantially 
increased the level of single-peakedness, thus providing empirical support for hypothesis 2 above. For 
a deliberative poll on the 1999 proposal in Australia to replace the monarchy with a republic, the level 
of single-peakedness was high both before and after deliberation, though the Condorcet winner 
changed from a republic with a directly elected president to a republic with an appointed president. 
Although the effect of deliberation on the indices of single-peakedness was less marked than in the 
Texas polls, the Australian results remain encouraging because in a situation where substantial 
preference shifts occurred, and where a cycle over three options was a live possibility (the third option 
being the status quo), deliberation appears to have protected against a loss of structure.  
 Finally, the claim that unpacking multiple relevant issue-dimensions facilitates intra-
dimensional preference structuration is compatible with a study by Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 
showing that the main point of disagreement and competition in politics is less what the best policy 
option within a specific issue-dimension is, more what issue-dimensions are relevant.79  
 
3.4 Relaxing Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
 
 We now suggest: 
Hypothesis 4. Group deliberation can lead individuals to reach agreement on the content of 
the set X of relevant alternatives. 
The hypothesis responds to the challenge that the non-existence of SWFs satisfying (I) 
(together with (U), (P), (D)) implies the inherent vulnerability of democracy to manipulability by 
changes of the agenda X. If the hypothesis is correct, then a relaxation of condition (I) becomes an 
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option. If the individuals agree on what the set of relevant alternatives X is, then there is little scope 
for an agenda-setter strategically to introduce or delete alternatives from X so as to affect the relative 
chances of other alternatives in X, and the logical possibility of agenda manipulation (implied by 
violations of (I)) no longer poses a problem. And, if we relax condition (I), then there exist SWFs 
generating transitive social orderings and satisfying (U), (P) and (D).  
 Positional rules, which are sensitive to the position of an alternative in each individual's 
ranking Ri, are well-known such SWFs.80 The Borda rule is the most famous example.81 Given 
{Ri}i∈N, the Borda rule determines a social ordering R as follows: for each alternative x in X and each 
individual i in N, let Bi(x) be the number of alternatives y in X such that xPiy; for every x and y in X, 
  
 xRy if and only B1(x)+B2(x)+...+Bn(x) ≥ B1(y)+B2(y)+...+Bn(y). 
 
 Why is hypothesis 4 plausible? The composition of the set of alternatives can itself be 
subjected to deliberation (or possibly to a decision by consensus or approval voting). Consider some 
experiments designed by Plott and Levine to demonstrate agenda manipulation, which involve 
subjects with induced preferences that they are told to keep secret from the others.82 The subjects take 
a series of votes on how a set of five alternatives is to be partitioned; each subset is then voted on, and 
its winner goes to the next step, eventually producing an overall winner. The experiments generally 
went as expected, failing to choose the Condorcet winner and revealing ubiquitous agenda 
manipulation, which is why Riker says they “impress me deeply”.83 However, there was one 
exception: when the chair of one group allowed a straw vote at the outset, the group then converged 
on the Condorcet winner. This straw vote revealed that one of the five alternatives was least preferred 
by everyone, and so led to dropping that alternative from the set of relevant alternatives. This straw 
vote was functionally equivalent to the use of deliberation for demarcating the set of relevant 
alternatives, showing how such demarcation can limit the scope for agenda manipulation. 
  This process may itself seem vulnerable to strategic manipulation, though only to the extent 
individuals behave according to rational-choice precepts. If they do not, then deliberation can be used 
to decide on a procedure for distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant alternatives – conceivably 
by approval voting or by consensus. Once the group has decided which alternatives are relevant, 
positional rules such as the Borda rule may be attractive aggregation mechanisms (and so perhaps 
legislatures should adopt this solution). Discussion about what alternatives are relevant seems inherent 
in decision processes of types JD-dd and JD-dv. 
 The fact that deliberators could decide to restrict the set of relevant alternatives does not mean 
that they will do so. But there is a mechanism intrinsic to deliberation that promotes this likelihood, 
relating to the argumentative (arg) and reflective (ref) aspects. In deliberation, an individual cannot 
simply introduce or support an alternative; he/she must justify that preference in terms others can 
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accept. Arguing strategically for an alternative that the individual does not truly support carries two 
risks. The first is that the argument may persuade others, inducing the group to choose that 
alternative. The second is that the individual may be exposed as a liar (either in argument or by 
subsequent voting behavior) – potentially incurring punishment as discussed in section 3.2. 
 To illustrate, assume the Borda rule is being used and there are three alternatives, x, y, z, with 
65 deliberators preferring x to y to z, and 35 deliberators preferring y to z to x. With Borda scores of 
130 for x, 135 for y, and 35 for z, a canny individual i sees that his favored alternative x will be beaten 
by y, but that introducing alternative w, which the 64 other proponents of x are likely to prefer to y, 
could change the situation. But now i must justify his (false) preference for w over x. Individual i may 
be prepared to lie here, but if the lie fails to convince others then i will suffer the penalties we 
mentioned in section 3.2. Other deliberators may well ask i why he chose to introduce w so late in the 
day; this, too, needs to be justified by i, and again there are penalties for lying. Moreover, if i has to 
argue against x to justify w, he risks convincing others that x (his true preference) is indeed 
undesirable. 
In conclusion, if deliberation can demarcate the set of relevant alternatives in a publicy 
acceptable way, a violation of condition (I) may become defensible, and positional rules may become 
attractive SWFs. 
 
3.5 Introducing More Information 
 
 While the responses discussed so far involve relaxation of one of Arrow's conditions, we now 
discuss a solution compatible with preserving, even strengthening, all the conditions. This may seem 
paradoxical: for Arrow shows that these conditions are mutually inconsistent. However, Sen argued 
that Arrow’s impossibility result is driven by the informational limitations of Arrow’s ordinalist 
framework.84 If we allow interpersonal comparisons of preference intensity or of a suitable individual 
welfare measure, then there exist aggregation mechanisms satisfying all of Arrow's conditions.  
We now assign to each individual i a personal welfare function Wi : X → R, where Wi(x) is 
interpreted as a measure of the welfare of individual i under alternative x. A social welfare functional 
(SWFL as distinct from a SWF) is a function F whose input is a profile of personal welfare functions 
{Wi}i∈N and whose output is a social ordering R.85 Assumptions on measurability and interpersonal 
comparability of welfare are formalized by specifying the class of transformations with respect to 
which a SWFL is required to be invariant.86 This class is also interpreted as the class of 
transformations up to which a profile of personal welfare functions is taken to be unique. The smaller 
this class of transformations, the more information is contained in a profile.  
Two such assumptions are ordinal measurability with interpersonal comparability of welfare 
levels (OLC) and cardinal measurability with interpersonal comparability of welfare units (CUC).87 
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Informally, (OLC) is the assumption that comparisons of the form "individual i under alternative x is 
at least as well off as individual j under alternative y" are meaningful, and (CUC) is the assumption 
that comparisons of the form "if we switch from alternative x to y, the ratio of individual i's welfare 
gain (or loss) to individual j's welfare gain (or loss) equals a" are meaningful. Other informational 
assumptions have been discussed.88 
 
 Theorem 7. (i) There exist SWFLs satisfying (OLC), (U), (P), (I) and (D); (ii) There exist 
SWFLs satisfying (CUC), (U), (P), (I) and (D).89 
 
Examples of SWFLs satisfying the conditions of parts (i) and (ii) of theorem 7 are, 
respectively, the leximin rule and the utilitarian rule.90  
The leximin-rule is a version of Rawls's (lexicographic) difference principle: make social 
choices to maximize the welfare-level of the worst-off individual; if there are ties, maximize, in a 
lexicographic order of priority, the welfare-levels of the second worst-off, third worst-off, ..., 
individuals.91 The leximin rule satisfies not only the conditions of theorem 7(i), but also more 
demanding conditions of anonymity, positive responsiveness, separability and minimal equity.92 
The utilitarian rule is a version of the classical utilitarian principle: maximize the sum-total of 
the welfare of all individuals. The utilitarian rule satisfies not only the conditions of theorem 7(ii), but 
also anonymity, positive responsiveness, separability and continuity.93 
How could this escape-route from Arrow's theorem apply in a deliberative democracy? 
Deliberation can concern not only first-order decisions on outcomes, but also second-order decisions 
on the design of institutions for solving (first-order) decision problems, such as the allocation of 
resources or distribution of benefits and burdens. A health care provider's decision on how much 
treatment to allocate to each patient, given limited resources, is a first-order decision of type ID. The 
provider's allocation of medical resources is based not on the expressed judgements or preferences of 
patients (although patients' expressions inform medical diagnoses), rather on an evaluation of different 
patients' needs by the (external) evaluation standard of the medical examinations of patients. The 
health authority's decision on what principle should govern such first-order health care allocation 
problems is the corresponding second-order decision concerning institutional design.  
Institutionally soluble first-order decision problems (particularly on the allocation or 
distribution of resources) can be interpreted as social choice problems of type ID consisting of two 
components: (i) an evaluation variable for assessing the interests of the individuals, and (ii) a decision 
principle for aggregating these individual interests (as assessed by (i)) into a collective outcome. The 
evaluation according to (i) can be formalized by a profile of personal welfare functions {Wi}i∈N; and 
the decision principle in (ii) by a SWFL F. 
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The escape-route from Arrow's theorem via introducing more information is available if the 
evaluation variable specified under (i) is interpersonally comparable. For certain types of evaluation 
variables, like the economist’s ‘revealed preferences’ or ‘utility’, such comparisons may not be 
meaningful. Robbins famously argued that "[i]ntrospection does not enable A to measure what is 
going on in B's mind, nor B to measure what is going on in A's. There is no way of comparing the 
satisfactions of two different people".94 But even if we concede Robbins’s claim, this entails not that 
the present escape-route is unavailable, only that it is necessary to use a (normative) evaluation 
variable other than utility or subjective satisfaction for which interpersonal comparisons are 
meaningful. 
Several such evaluation variables have been proposed, including Rawls’s index of primary 
goods – non-mentalistic and measurable from the perspective of an external observer;95 Sen's 
functionings and capabilities – again non-mentalistic and externally measurable;96 and the United 
Nation's Human Development Index (HDI), combining life expectancy, educational attainment and 
income. Using a Rawlsian index of primary goods as the evaluation variable and the leximin rule as 
the decision principle will satisfy the conditions of theorem 7. Depending on what type of 
measurability and interpersonal comparability a chosen evaluation variable permits, several different 
aggregation procedures are available. 
The task of deliberation can then be summarized as follows. 
Hypothesis 5. Group deliberation in second-order decisions on institutional design can lead 
individuals to reach agreement on (i) an evaluation variable for assessing individual interests that is 
interpersonally comparable, and (ii) a decision principle for aggregating individual interests (as 
assessed by the chosen evaluation variable) into a collective outcome. 
Is there any mechanism intrinsic to deliberation making it likely that suitable arguments for 
(i) and (ii) will be made and accepted? Rawls's original position or Habermas's ideal speech situation 
are hypothetical deliberation situations involving precisely such arguments. In these hypothetical 
situations, one mechanism is that the argumentative (arg) and reflective (ref) aspects of deliberation 
impose justification and transparency constraints on the outcomes of second-order decisions such as 
(1) formal generality, (2) universal applicability, (3) publicity, (4) finality and (5) ordering. In 
Rawls’s original position,97 the effect of these constraints is to narrow down the range of acceptable 
institutional arrangements. An interpersonally comparable evaluation variable – like an index of 
primary goods or an index of functionings – may seem more transparent and publicly justifiable than 
a publicly inscrutable (and interpersonally non-comparable) mentalistic evaluation variable. Similarly, 
a well-defined and systematic aggregation mechanism may seem more consistent with constraints (1) 
to (5) than a non-principled decision method based, for instance, on discretion.  
Gutmann and Thompson identify reciprocity, the need for individuals to provide each other 
with mutually acceptable reasons for favoured decisions, as a principle resulting from the reflective 
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(ref) aspect of deliberation.98 Under reciprocity, “citizens as well as theorists consider what justice 
requires in the case of specific laws”.99 Gutmann and Thompson argue that deliberators as well as 
theorists can derive substantive principles – including principles of distributive justice – from the 
reciprocity idea. These include, for example, choosing “basic opportunities” as an evaluation 
standard. Though treated by Gutmann and Thompson as subject to deliberative revision, basic 
opportunities resemble Rawls’s primary goods in that they are foundational to all individual life 
projects. 
Beyond these hypothetical examples, some real-world systems of government have produced 
results of the form of (i) and (ii). Corporatist government involves cooperation between encompassing 
labor and business federations, previously locked in a zero-sum distributional game. The agreements 
produced often constitute enduring distributive rules, with both an evaluation variable and an 
aggregation principle. For example, in Austria (the corporatist archetype) the Parity Commission for 
Wages and Prices set up in 1957 made its decisions so as to maximize growth in national income 
while compensating those adversely affected by the resulting structural adjustment.100 The evaluation 
variable is therefore income measured in conventional terms. The aggregation principle is a type of 
utilitarian Pareto criterion: maximize average income and fully compensate losers. The “social 
corporatist” Nordic countries, in contrast, favour an evaluation variable more akin to Rawlsian 
primary goods, with an income-invariant distribution of equal entitlements to these goods.101 A 
recently introduced British deliberative body, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), 
develops principles in the form of (i) and (ii) for allocating expensive health care. NICE uses "basic 
opportunities" as an evaluation variable, determining whether to provide public funds for new drugs 
in terms of how different funding schemes for the drug would affect basic opportunities of citizens.102  
 We do not suggest that deliberative democracy should convert all collective decision 
problems into type ID, only that, given democratic agreement, this route can be taken for some 
allocation and distribution problems. The arguments of the previous sections apply to the many 
remaining decision problems of type JD (possibly including second-order decisions on how to specify 




 We have argued that the seemingly conflicting approaches of deliberative democracy and 
social choice theory can be reconciled. Deliberation facilitates pursuit of several escape-routes from 
the impossibility results commonly invoked by social-choice-theoretic critics of democracy. The shift 
from purely voting-based decision-making to decision-making based on the informational, 
argumentative, reflective and social aspects of deliberation opens up many possibilities for 
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meaningful collective decisions. To summarize, the identified escape-routes from social-choice-
theoretic impossibility problems are the following:  
(i) If deliberation induces individuals to reveal their preferences and views truthfully (hypothesis 
1), then strategic manipulation becomes less of a threat in deliberation, and a relaxation of 
condition (S) provides an acceptable escape-route from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, 
compatible with all other conditions of the theorem. 
(ii) If deliberation induces preference structuration – narrowing the domain of actual preference 
profiles to a domain in which the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite problems do not apply – 
(hypothesis 2), then both cycling and strategic manipulation become less of a threat in 
deliberation, and relaxation of condition (U) provides acceptable escape-routes from Arrow’s 
theorem and from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, compatible with all other conditions of 
these theorems. 
(iii) If deliberation helps uncover or create the tacit issue-dimensions that ‘cause’ a lack of 
preference structuration, and induce greater preference structuration in each separate 
dimension (hypothesis 3), then dimension-specific aggregation in accordance with all of the 
conditions of Arrow’s theorem or the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (except condition (U)) 
becomes possible, and one of the following solutions to the overall decision problem may 
become available: subdividing the decision, lexicographic hierarchies of dimensions, 
logrolling, or demonstrating the nature of the problem and creatively crafting new 
alternatives. 
(iv) If deliberation can produce agreement on what the set of relevant alternatives is (hypothesis 
4), then agenda manipulation becomes less of a threat, and relaxation of condition (I) provides 
an acceptable escape-route from Arrow’s theorem, compatible with all other conditions of the 
theorem. 
(v) If deliberation can produce agreement on an interpersonally comparable evaluation variable 
for assessing individual interests and a decision principle for aggregating individual interests 
into a collective outcome (hypothesis 5), then a solution to Arrow’s problem that is consistent 
with all of Arrow’s conditions becomes available for a range of institutionally soluble 
collective allocation or distribution problems. 
The role of deliberation is to bring about situations in which the antecedents of these “if-then” results 
are satisfied. The normative component of our argument is that the constraints required for bringing 
about such situations are either inherent in, or at least consistent with, core deliberative principles. 
Moreover, our arguments rest on empirical hypotheses about the effects of deliberation. Whether or 
not deliberation will induce each of the antecedents of the “if-then” results ultimately depends on the 
specifics of particular cases.  
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While we have adduced available empirical evidence and illustrations in support of our 
hypotheses, more research is necessary to investigate deliberation’s strength on each of the identified 
escape-routes from the social-choice-theoretic impossibility problems. But for the moment we 
conclude that deliberative democracy and social choice theory are mutually supportive. The former is 
concerned with identification of the functions that deliberation ought to, and indeed can, perform in 
democratic decision making, and the latter is concerned with the clarification of the logical properties 
of available procedures for solving the aggregation aspects of democratic decision problems. Thus 
social choice theory shows exactly what deliberation must accomplish in order to render collective 





Table 1: A prisoners’ dilemma of manipulability 
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Table 2. Single-peaked personal preference orderings 
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